Chapter 8 – Pity

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So much for Kindness and Unkindness. Let us now consider Pity, asking ourselves what things excite pity, and for what persons, and in what states of our mind pity is felt. Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain caused by the sight of some evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon.

In order to feel pity, we must obviously be capable of supposing that some evil may happen to us or some friend of ours, and moreover some such evil as is stated in our definition or is more or less of that kind. It is therefore not felt by those completely ruined, who suppose that no further evil can befall them, since the worst has befallen them already; nor by those who imagine themselves immensely fortunate — their feeling is rather presumptuous insolence, for when they think they possess all the good things of life, it is clear that the impossibility of evil befalling them will be included, this being one of the good things in question.

Those who think evil may befall them are:

  • Those that have already had it befall them and have safely escaped from it;
  • elderly men, owing to their good sense and their experience;
  • weak men, especially men inclined to cowardice;
  • and also educated people, since these can take long views.
  • Also those who have parents living, or children, or wives; for these are our own, and the evils mentioned above may easily befall them.
  • And those who are neither moved by:
  1.  
    1. any courageous emotion, such as anger or confidence (these emotions take no account of the future),
    2. nor by a disposition to presumptuous insolence (insolent men, too, take no account of the possibility that something evil will happen to them),
    3. nor yet by great fear (panic-stricken people do not feel pity, because they are taken up with what is happening to themselves);

They only those feel pity who are between these extremes.

In order to feel pity we must also believe in the goodness of at least some people; if you think nobody good, you will believe that everybody deserves evil fortune.  And, generally, we feel pity whenever we are in the condition of remembering that similar misfortunes have happened to us or ours, or expecting them to happen in the future.

So much for the mental conditions under which we feel pity.

What we pity is stated clearly in the definition. All unpleasant and painful things excite pity if they tend to destroy pain and annihilate; and all such evils as are due to chance, if they are serious. The painful and destructive evils are: death in its various forms, bodily injuries and afflictions, old age, diseases, lack of food.

The evils due to chance are:

  • friendlessness,
  • scarcity of friends (it is a pitiful thing to be torn away from friends and companions),
  • deformity,
  • weakness,
  • mutilation;
  • evil coming from a source from which good ought to have come;
  • and the frequent repetition of such misfortunes.
  • Also the coming of good when the worst has happened: e.g. the arrival of the Great King’s gifts for Diopeithes after his death.
  • Also that either no good should have befallen a man at all, or that he should not be able to enjoy it when it has.

The grounds, then, on which we feel pity are these or like these.

The people we pity are:

  • those whom we know, if only they are not very closely related to us — in that case we feel about them as if we were in danger ourselves. For this reason Amasis did not weep, they say, at the sight of his son being led to death, but did weep when he saw his friend begging: the latter sight was pitiful, the former terrible, and the terrible is different from the pitiful; it tends to cast out pity, and often helps to produce the opposite of pity.
  • Again, we feel pity when the danger is near ourselves.
  • Also we pity those who are like us in age, character, disposition, social standing, or birth; for in all these cases it appears more likely that the same misfortune may befall us also. Here too we have to remember the general principle that what we fear for ourselves excites our pity when it happens to others.
  • Further, since it is when the sufferings of others are close to us that they excite our pity (we cannot remember what disasters happened a hundred centuries ago, nor look forward to what will happen a hundred centuries hereafter, and therefore feel little pity, if any, for such things): it follows that those who heighten the effect of their words with suitable gestures, tones, dress, and dramatic action generally, are especially successful in exciting pity: they thus put the disasters before our eyes, and make them seem close to us, just coming or just past. 
  • Anything that has just happened, or is going to happen soon, is particularly piteous: so too therefore are the tokens and the actions of sufferers — the garments and the like of those who have already suffered; the words and the like of those actually suffering — of those, for instance, who are on the point of death.
  • Most piteous of all is it when, in such times of trial, the victims are persons of noble character: whenever they are so, our pity is especially excited, because their innocence, as well as the setting of their misfortunes before our eyes, makes their misfortunes seem close to ourselves.

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Published on June 26, 2009 at 5:42 pm  Leave a Comment  

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